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ists working in conflict zones are regularly exposed to trauma
as part of their jobs and suffer higher rates of posttraumatic
stress compared with the general population. These individ-
uals often know that they will be exposed to trauma and
therefore have the opportunity to adopt potentially protective
cognitive strategies. One cognitive strategy linked to better
mood and recovery from upsetting events is concrete
information processing. Conversely, abstract information
processing is linked to the development of anxiety and
depression. We trained 50 healthy participants to apply an
abstract or concrete mode of processing to six traumatic film
clips and to apply this mode of processing to a posttraining
traumatic film. Intrusive memories of the films were recorded
for 1 week and the Impact of Events Scale–Revised (IES-R;
Weiss&Marmar, 1997) was completed at 1-week follow-up.
As predicted, participants in the concrete condition reported
significantly fewer intrusive memories in response to the films
and had lower IES-R scores compared with those in the
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intrusive memories in everyday life was significantly correlat-
ed with intrusive memories of the films, whereas trait
rumination, trait dissociation, and sleep difficulties were not.
Findings suggest that training individuals to adopt a concrete
mode of information processing during analogue trauma
may protect against the development of intrusive memories.
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COGNITIVE MODELS OF POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS
Disorder (PTSD; e.g., Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph,
1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) emphasize peritrau-
matic processing as an important factor influencing
the development of PTSD. According to these
models, dysfunctional information processing may
disrupt the formation of a coherent narrative of the
event, giving rise to intrusive memories and
associated distress. In the wider literature, a
distinction is made between abstract and concrete
modes of information processing. Concrete pro-
cessing focuses on “how” an event is happening, on
direct experience, and means to desired ends (e.g.,
steps needed to achieve a goal), whereas abstract
processing is characterized by generalized thoughts
conveying overall meaning as well as “why?” and
“what if?” questions with no obvious answer
(Watkins, 2008). Processes such as worry and
rumination, which are associated with a range of
disorders including PTSD, are characterized by an
abstract style of processing (Behar et al., 2012;
Goldwin & Behar, 2012; Stöber, Tepperwien, &
Staak, 2002; Watkins &Moulds, 2007). According
405proce s s ing mode and intrus i ve memor i e sto theories of worry, it is the abstract-verbal (as
opposed to concrete-imagery-based) nature of
worry that accounts for its maladaptive effects. It
is hypothesized that this thinking style inhibits
emotional processing of fearful imagery, strength-
ening anxious meanings and interfering with
problem solving (Behar et al., 2012; Borkovec,
Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; Stöber, 1998). Recent
research found that ambulance workers who
adopted more abstract “why?” thoughts during
exposure to trauma reported poorer levels of
coping, suggesting that abstract thinking during
trauma may be unhelpful (Shepherd & Wild,
2014). In this study, we investigated the link
between abstract and concrete modes of processing
during analogue trauma and the subsequent devel-
opment of intrusive memories.
Accumulating evidence suggests that training
individuals to process events (either during or
afterwards) in a concrete relative to an abstract
way increases resilience to these events. Watkins,
Moberly, and Moulds (2008) trained participants
to think about ambiguous scenarios in a concrete or
abstract way, and found that concrete training led
to reduced despondency in response to a subse-
quent failure experience compared with abstract
training. In an earlier study, Watkins (2004)
instructed healthy participants to think about an
induced failure experience afterwards in an abstract
or concrete way. Those who were instructed to
think about the failure experience in a concrete way
experienced fewer intrusive memories of it com-
pared with those who had thought about it in an
abstract way. Watkins, Baeyens, and Read (2009)
found that concreteness training also reduced
depressive symptoms in dysphoric individuals and
suggested that concreteness training could be used
as a guided self-help intervention for individuals
with mild to moderate depressive symptoms.
Ehring, Szeimies, and Schaffrick (2009) investi-
gated whether post-event abstract processing could
account for the maladaptive effects of trauma-
related rumination using the trauma film paradigm.
This paradigm induces analogue posttraumatic
stress symptoms (e.g., intrusive memories and
distress) by exposing participants to analogue
trauma (i.e., traumatic films), and allows for the
manipulation of variables that might increase or
decrease symptoms (see Holmes & Bourne, 2008,
for a review). Ehring and colleagues exposed
healthy participants to a traumatic film depicting
the aftermath of road traffic accidents, and then
randomly assigned them to one of three conditions
(abstract rumination, concrete thinking, or a
distraction control) for 10 minutes. In the abstract
condition, participants were asked to dwell onsentences containing abstract thoughts about the
footage (e.g., “Why do so many accidents have to
happen?”), whereas in the concrete condition, they
were asked to read sentences containing concrete
thoughts (e.g., “What are the different reasons for
accidents happening?”). In the distraction condi-
tion, they were asked to read unrelated, neutral
sentences. Abstract rumination led to significantly
longer duration of negative mood and arousal
following the film than did concrete thinking and
distraction. No significant differences in number,
vividness, or distress of intrusive memories during a
2-minute follow-up period were found between the
abstract and concrete conditions and, unexpected-
ly, those in the distraction condition showed the
highest number of intrusions. Participants in the
concrete condition reported significantly fewer
intrusive memories than those in the distraction
condition, whereas there was no significant differ-
ence in number of intrusive memories between
those in the abstract and distraction conditions.
Studies adopting the trauma film paradigm can
inform our understanding of how to modify
peritraumatic processes to potentially influence
the development of symptoms associated with
PTSD. Using such a paradigm, Schartau,
Dalgleish, and Dunn (2009) investigated whether
training individuals to apply adaptive appraisals to
a series of distressing films would reduce their
emotional reactivity to a subsequent traumatic film.
They trained healthy individuals to apply these
appraisals to a series of distressing films or to watch
the films without trying to regulate their emotions
in any way. The appraisals were based on themes of
seeing “the bigger picture,” such as “bad things
happen,” “silver lining,” “broader perspective,”
and “time heals.” Their emotional reactions to test
films pre- and post-training were compared with
controls’. Participants who underwent appraisal
training reported less negative emotion (distress
and horror) and exhibited a greater reduction in
psychophysiological responses from pre- to post-
training compared with the control group.
The effect of abstract versus concrete peritraumatic
processing has yet to be investigated in relation to
intrusive memory development. In addition to
processing mode, a number of other individual
difference variables may affect vulnerability to
developing intrusivememories. Both trait rumination
and dissociation have been linked to the development
of intrusive memories and PTSD (Murray, 1997;
Murray et al., 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow,
1991). Sleep difficulties have also been implicated in
the development and maintenance of intrusive
memories. Mellman, David, Kulick-Bell, Hebding,
andNolan (1995) found that greater pretrauma sleep
406 white & wilddifficulties predicted the development of PTSD,
although these were rated retrospectively and there-
fore may have been influenced by recall bias. Finally,
another factor that has been linked to intrusive
memories is individual proneness to intrusive mem-
ories.Davies andClark (1998) found that individuals
who reported a higher tendency to experience
intrusive memories in their everyday lives experi-
enced more intrusive memories in response to a
traumatic film.
Using a trauma film paradigm, we investigated the
effect of training individuals to apply either an
abstract or concrete processing mode during expo-
sure to an analogue trauma on the subsequent
development of intrusive memories. We also inves-
tigated the effect of these training procedures on
emotional reactivity to a subsequent stressor and the
relationship between potential vulnerability factors
and the development of intrusions. We hypothesized
that: (a) compared with abstract training, concrete
training while watching a series of traumatic films
would lead to fewer intrusive memories of the films
and lower scores on a measure of PTSD severity at
1-week follow-up; (b) compared with abstract
training, concrete training would lead to reduced
emotional reactivity to a subsequent stressor; and
(c) individual vulnerability factors previously linked
to PTSD (trait rumination, trait dissociation, pre-
existing sleep difficulties, and proneness to intrusive
memories) would be associated with the develop-
ment of intrusive memories and scores on the
measure of PTSD symptom severity. Finally, since
low mood is associated with intrusions (Davies &
Clark, 1998) and exposure to analogue trauma can
reducemood (Ehring et al., 2009; Zetsche, Ehring,&
Ehlers, 2009), we investigated whether reductions in
mood during the experimental session were linked to
the development of intrusions.
Method
participants
A power analysis based on the effect sizes from a
similar study by Schartau et al. (2009) was used to
determine the sample size. Results showed that a
sample size of 25 in each condition would have 80%
power to detect a significant difference in mean
change scores between the abstract and concrete
conditions using a two-group t test with a two-tailed
.05 significance level. Therefore, we concluded that a
total of 50 participants would be needed.
Participants over the age of 18were recruited from
King’s College London through an email circular.
We excluded participants who self-reported amental
health problem, scored 10 or higher on a standard-
izedmeasure of depression, or scored 33 or higher on
a standardized measure of posttraumatic stress. Weexcluded these individuals for three reasons: (a) as an
ethical measure to reduce distress in already vulner-
able individuals; (b) to increase homogeneity of
participants across the two conditions; and (c) to
replicate the samples of studies that have previously
used the trauma film paradigm (e.g., Ehring et al.,
2009; Schartau et al., 2009). A total of 2 participants
were excluded for scoring above cutoff on the
screening measures, and 1 participant was excluded
for failure to follow the instructions during the
posttraining test film. This left 50 participants: 26
were randomly assigned to the abstract condition (15
female, Mage = 27.15, SD = 9.11), and 24 to the
concrete condition (13 female, Mage = 24.71, SD =
5.35). Conditions were comparable on age, t(48) =
1.15, p = .258) and sex, χ2(1) = 0.06, p = .802.
Ethical approval for the study was granted by the
Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics
Committee at King’s College London.
measures
Demographic Questionnaire (Unpublished)
A brief demographic questionnaire was included to
collect relevant demographic information to ensure
equivalence of conditions on age, gender, and
driving frequency (since most of the films contained
exposure to RTA footage).
Patient Health Questionnaire–9 (Kroenke, Spitzer,
& Williams, 2001)
Depression was assessed using the Patient Health
Questionnaire–9 (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, &
Williams, 2001), a brief depression severity measure
consisting of 9 items. Scores range from 0 to 27, with
higher scores indicating greater depression severity.
This measure has demonstrated high internal consis-
tency (α = .86–.89), good test–retest reliability (r =
.84), and correlates significantly with other standard-
izedmeasures of depression. The recommended cutoff
of ≥10 (Kroenke et al., 2001) was used to indicate
major depression in this study. Internal consistency for
the current study was modest (Cronbach’s α = .50).
Impact of Event Scale–Revised (Weiss & Marmar,
1997)
Posttraumatic stress symptoms (both prior to
participation and at 1-week follow-up) were
assessed using the Impact of Event Scale–Revised
(IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997), a widely used
measure of PTSD severity, consisting of 22 items.
Scores range from 0 to 88, with higher scores
indicating greater severity of PTSD symptoms. The
scale has shown high internal consistency (α = .96;
Creamer, Bell, & Failla, 2003) and test–retest
reliability coefficients that range from r = .51 to
.94 for the individual subscales (Weiss & Marmar,
1997). Concurrent validity has been documented,
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the Posttraumatic Checklist (Blanchard, Jones-
Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996), an estab-
lished measure of PTSD (Creamer et al., 2003). We
used a cutoff of ≥33 to indicate clinically signifi-
cant levels of PTSD, as recommended by Creamer
et al. (2003). High internal consistency was found
for the current sample both for preexisting symptom
levels (α = .87) and at 1-week follow-up (α = .89).
Trauma Screener (Unpublished)
Participants also completed the Trauma Screener
(unpublished), a self-report inventory of prior
exposure to traumatic events, which has been
used in previous studies (e.g., Ehlers, Mayou, &
Bryant, 1998) and is derived from the trauma
checklist included in the Clinician-Administered
PTSD Scale (Blake et al., 1990). It includes a
checklist of 16 events such as serious traffic
accidents, serious other accidents (e.g., fire or
explosion), sexual or nonsexual assault, and others.
It was used to establish an index traumatic event for
completing the IES-R and to ensure that the event
was one in which the person “experienced,
witnessed or was confronted with an event or
events that involved actual or threatened death or
serious physical injury, or a threat to the physical
integrity of self or others” (Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual [DSM-IV]; APA, 1994).
State–Trait Anxiety Inventory–Trait Version
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs,
1983)
The State–Trait Anxiety Inventory–Trait Version
(STAI-T) was administered to assess equivalence of
conditions in proneness to anxiety. This is a widely
used self-report measure that assesses tendency to
feel anxious in response to stressful situations
(Spielberger et al., 1983). It contains 20 items,
with scores ranging from 20 to 80, and higher
scores indicating higher levels of trait anxiety. It has
demonstrated high internal consistency (median
α = .90), acceptable test–retest reliability ranging
from r = .73 to r = .86 in nonclinical samples, and
it correlates with other trait anxiety measures
(Spielberger et al., 1983). Internal consistency for
the current study was high (α = .87).
Intrusions Diary (Unpublished)
Number of intrusive memories experienced in the
week following the experiment was measured using
an intrusions diary, a standard way of assessing the
frequency of intrusions (Holmes & Bourne, 2008).
Participants were asked to record daily the number
of times they had experienced spontaneously
occurring intrusive memories of any of the films.
For each intrusion they had, they were asked torecord which film it referred to (to check that
intrusions corresponded to films viewed in the
study).
Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (Ehring
et al., 2010)
Trait rumination was measured using the Persevera-
tive Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring et al.,
2010), a content-independent self-report measure of
repetitive negative thinking (including rumination). It
contains 15 items, with scores ranging from 0 to 60,
with higher scores indicating a greater tendency
toward repetitive negative thinking. Excellent internal
consistency (α = 0.94–0.95) but limited test–retest
reliability (r = 0.69) have been reported. It demon-
strates convergent validity, correlating significantly
with standard measures of rumination and worry
(ranging from r = .48 to r = .72; Ehring et al., 2010).
It also shows concurrent validity, with significant and
moderate correlations found with severity of anxiety
(r = .64) and depressive (r = .54–.58) symptoms
(Ehring et al., 2010). Internal consistency was high
for the current sample (α = .94).
Trait Dissociation Questionnaire–Short Version
(TDQs; Murray, 1997)
Trait dissociation was measured using the Trait
Dissociation Questionnaire–Short Version (TDQs;
Murray, 1997), a measure of trait disposition to
dissociate. It contains 11 items, with scores ranging
from 0 to 55, with higher scores reflecting greater
trait dissociation. The measure has been validated
using an outpatient sample and correlates highly
with the original TDQ (r = 0.94), which has been
shown to predict intrusive memories in a student
population. It evidences high internal consistency
(α = 0.86) but limited test–retest reliability (r = 0.56;
Murray, 1997). Internal consistency for the current
sample was acceptable (α = .74).
Proneness to Intrusive Memories Scale (PIMS;
Unpublished)
To assess individual proneness to intrusive memo-
ries, we administered a 5-point scale asking partic-
ipants to rate the frequency with which they tended
to experience intrusive memories of stressful or
unpleasant events ranging from 0 (not at all) to 5
(five times a week or more).
Insomnia Severity Index (ISI; Morin, Barlow, &
Dement, 1993)
To assess preexperiment sleep difficulties, we admin-
istered the Insomnia Severity Index (ISI; Morin,
Barlow, & Dement, 1993), a brief 7-item screening
measure for insomnia severity over the previous
2 weeks. Total scores range from0 to 28,with higher
scores indicating higher severity of insomnia. The
measure has been validated on younger and older
408 white & wildpopulations attending a sleep clinic or receiving
treatment for insomnia, and has demonstrated
adequate internal consistency (α = 0.74–0.78). It
has also demonstrated concurrent validity, correlat-
ing significantly with other measures of insomnia
(sleep diaries, polysomnography, and informant and
clinician reports), and sensitivity in detecting change
in perceived sleep difficulties following treatment
(Bastien, Vallières, &Morin, 2001). Internal consis-
tency was high for the current sample (α = .86).
procedure
Informed consent was obtained for all participants
before taking part in the study. Participants
completed the pretraining measures (PTQ, TDQs,
PIMS, and ISI) and were randomly allocated to the
abstract or concrete training condition to complete
the film task. They were told that this involved
watching a series of film clips of real-life traumatic
footage, which they would be asked to watch in a
particular way according to some instructions they
would be given. The film task was adapted from
Schartau et al. (2009). The two test films (shown
pre- and posttraining) contained real-life footage of
the aftermath of road traffic accidents (RTAs) and
showed emergency service personnel working to
extract trapped victims, severely injured individuals
in distress, and dead bodies being moved. These
were selected from a series of films containing
footage of RTAs compiled by Steil (1997), which
has been used in previous studies (e.g., Holmes
et al., 2004; Murray, 1997; Steil, 1997). The series
of films was piloted on a small sample of student
volunteers (N = 10) from King’s College London
who met the study’s eligibility criteria, to establish
which two films evoked the most distress and hence
would best serve as a pre- and posttraining test
films. The two films selected were rated as the most
distressing (N 55 on a 0–100 scale) and were
comparable in the level of distress they evoked
(pretraining film: M = 55.30, SD = 27.81; post-
training film: M = 59.70, SD = 23.45; t(9) =
1.346, p = .211). Three additional RTA films
were selected from this series as practice films.
The remaining three practice films were borrowedAffect
rating
Pretraining 
test film and 
ratings 
(distress, 
horror, & 
personal 
relevance)
Training 
instructions 
and films
FIGURE 1 Overviwith permission from Schartau et al. (2009) and
included non-RTA scenes of violence involving
animals and humans. We selected both RTA and
non-RTA films so that participants could practice
on a range of stimuli. Films ranged from 21 to
137 seconds (M = 89.00, SD = 35.88). Each film
contained a short introduction at the beginning
explaining what each depicted.
Films were shown on a 15-in. computer screen
and the film task followed six steps (see Figure 1).
First, participants were asked to rate their current
affect on a scale ranging from 0 (extremely
negative) to 100 (extremely positive). Second, they
were shown the pretraining test film and asked to
simply watch it as they would normally, before
rating their emotional reactions to it. Emotional
reactivity was indexed by two scales ranging from 0
to 100, which measured distress (ranging from no
distress to extreme distress) and horror (ranging
from no horror to extreme horror). Distress and
horror were chosen as they were the target
emotions used by Schartau et al. (2009), who
demonstrated an effect of appraisal training on
these emotions in reaction to distressing films. They
also noted that generalized emotion terms (e.g.,
distress and negative emotion) have been demon-
strated as reliable indices of emotion change in
response to experimental manipulations (Richards
& Gross, 2000) and bear similarity to the
Subjective Units of Distress measure, which is
often used in clinical research and practice (e.g.,
Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006), as well as being
emotions historically elicited by traumatic experi-
ences. Participants also rated the degree of personal
relevance of the pretraining test film. They were
asked, “How much personal relevance did this film
have for you?”with the scale ranging from 0 (none)
to 100 (extreme). This was included to assess any
differences between the conditions in the extent to
which the films were personally relevant.
Third, participants were given instructions for how
to watch the subsequent films and shown the six
practice films. Instructions were presented verbally at
first, aswell as being presented on the computer screen
before each practice film. After each film, the wordAffect
rating
Posttraining
test 
film and 
ratings 
(distress, 
horror, & 
personal 
relevance) 
Manipulation 
check 
measures 
(attention &  
instruction 
compliance)
ew of film task.
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aimed to minimize any accumulative effect of the
training phase on mood. Participants in the abstract
condition received the following instructions: “When
watching the films, please focus on: (1) Why these
sorts of things happen; (2) What it means about the
world; (3) What it means for the people involved;
(4)What if this were to happen to you, or someone in
your family?” For participants in the concrete
condition, the instructions were as follows: “When
watching the films, please focus on: (1) The specific
and objective details of the event, for example, what
you can see, what you can hear; (2) The sequence of
events as they are unfolding; (3) What needs to
happen step by step from here.” Following Schartau
et al. (2009), before the first practice film, partici-
pants were given examples of how they might apply
the assigned processing mode to it, before practicing
applying it on their own. For the remaining films,
examples were not given beforehand although after
each of the first three films, participants were asked
to give examples of their thoughts whilewatching the
film so that the investigator could be sure that they
understood the instructions and that their thoughts
reflected their assigned processing mode. Where
participants were clearly not applying the required
mode of processing or their feedback reflected
thoughts that were inconsistent with that mode of
processing, the instructions were repeated with
further clarification and examples where necessary.
For the remaining three films, participants were
simply asked whether they thought they had
successfully applied the required processing mode
and prompted to continue doing so.
Fourth, participants were asked to rate their affect
for the second time on the scale ranging from 0
(extremely negative) to 100 (extremely positive).2
Fifth, participants were shown the posttraining test
filmwith instructions presented onscreen telling them
towatch it in theway that they had been practicing so
far, followed by the assessment of emotional reactiv-
ity (i.e., self-report ratings of distress and horror in
response to the final film) and personal relevance
ratings. Sixth, a manipulation check was carried out
whereby participants were asked to rate their level of
adherence to the instructions on a scale, which asked:
“To what extent did you watch the film according to
the instructions given to you?” with responses
ranging from 0 (none of the time) to 100 (all of the
time). In addition, their level of attention to the film2 Four participants in the concrete condition and seven
participants in the abstract condition did not complete this measure
before and after the films. Therefore, the total sample included in
analyses relating to this variable only is N = 39 (rather than
N = 50).was assessed by asking: “To what extent did you pay
attention to the film?” with a scale of responses
ranging from 0 (none of the time) to 100 (all of the
time). Participants were excluded if their level of
adherence or attention was less than 50%, which
resulted in one participant being excluded from the
analysis.
Afterwards, participants were given the intrusions
diary and asked to record any spontaneous intrusive
memories of any of the scenes they saw during the
films for the following week. The experimenter
checked that participants were not showing signifi-
cant signs of distress before leaving the session and
provided participants with one of the researcher’s
contact details should they wish to discuss their
experience of the study. Participants posted the diary
back 1 week later following an email prompt, which
contained a link to an online version of the IES-R that
theywere asked to complete. Theywere also asked to
rate to what extent they completed the diary reliably
and accurately on a 5-point scale, with responses
ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (all of the time).
Participants were given a payment of £15 as
compensation for their time.
Results
premanipulation group differences
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for demograph-
ic and baseline variables by condition. Independent
samples t tests revealed no differences between the
conditions in levels of depression, preexisting PTSD
symptoms, number of previous traumas, trait
anxiety, trait rumination, trait dissociation, sleep
difficulties, proneness to intrusive memories, base-
line affect, personal relevance ratings, or emotional
reactivity ratings for the pretraining film (all
ps N .05). A chi-squared test revealed that condi-
tions were also comparable on driving frequency,
χ2(1) = 0.24, p = .877.
instruction and diary compliance
Participants generally reported paying attention to
the posttraining test film (M = 92.10, SD = 10.84)
and adhering to the instructions (M = 85.90, SD =
10.43), and there were no differences between the
conditions on these measures (attention: t[48] =
0.02, p = .983; adherence: t[48] = 0.31, p = .757).
Participants generally reported completing the
diary reliably and accurately most of the time
(M = 3.79, SD = 0.41) and there were no
between-group differences, t(48) = 0.63, p = .534.
effect of processing mode training
on affect
To investigate the effect of training on affect
following the practice films, we conducted a 2
Table 1
Sample Characteristics and Means (With Standard
Deviations) at the Initial Pretraining Assessment by Condition
Variable
Condition
Abstract
(n = 26)
Concrete
(n = 25)
Gender 15 female 13 female
Age (years) 27.15 (9.11) 24.71 (5.35)
Drove frequently
(at least once a week)
7 (26.9%) 6 (25%)
PHQ-9 1.88 (2.18) 2.17 (1.20)
STAI-T 30.15 (7.15) 32.58 (7.19)
Trauma checklist 1.38 (1.42) 1.33 (1.61)
IES-R (baseline) 5.15 (6.29) 6.54 (7.83)
PTQ 14.54 (9.47) 16.83 (11.26)
TDQs 6.92 (5.76) 6.75 (4.23)
ISI 5.31 (5.42) 4.38 (2.84)
PIMS 1.31 (1.16) 1.25 (1.03)
Baseline affect 75.25 (16.82) 72.75 (11.72)
Personal relevance
of pretraining test film
15.00 (23.37) 14.17 (21.65)
Personal relevance
of posttraining test film
35.38 (31.53) 27.71 (30.29)
Pretraining test film distress 49.81 (23.34) 45.21 (25.43)
Pretraining test film horror 47.12 (24.67) 41.46 (27.72)
Note. PHQ-9 = 9-item Personal Health Questionnaire; STAI-T =
State Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait version; IES-R = Impact of
Events Scale-Revised; PTQ = Perseverative Thinking Question-
naire; TDQs = Trait Dissociation Questionnaire-short version;
ISI = Insomnia Severity Index; PIMS = Proneness to Intrusive
Memories Scale.
410 white & wild(Condition: abstract, concrete) × 2 (Time: pretrain-
ing, posttraining) mixed model analysis of variance
(ANOVA), with Condition as the between-subjects
factor and Time as the repeated measures factor.
Results indicated a significant main effect of Time,
F(1, 37) = 104.36, p b .001, ηp
2 = .74, which was
qualified by a significant Condition × Time
interaction, F(1, 37) = 5.26, p = .028 ηp
2 = .12
(see Figure 2). Paired samples t tests confirmed
that participants in both conditions rated their
affect as more negative from pre- to posttraining
(abstract: t[18] = 8.22, p b .001, d = −2.25, 95%
CI [28.21, 47.58]; concrete: t[19] = 6.06, p b .001,
d = −1.62, 95% CI [15.71, 32.30]). A t test
confirmed that the decrease in affect was greater
in the abstract condition than in the concrete
condition, t(37) = −2.29, p = .028, d = 0.73, 95%
CI [−26.17, −1.619].
effect of processing mode training
on the development of intrusive
memories and ies-r scores
Of the whole sample, 47 participants (94%)
reported at least one intrusive memory relating tothe films. Figure 3 shows the number of intrusions
and IES-R scores by condition. We conducted
independent samples t tests to test our prediction
that participants in the concrete condition would
experience fewer intrusions during the following
week and lower IES-R scores at 1-week follow-up.
As predicted, participants in the concrete condition
reported significantly fewer intrusive memories
over the following week than those in the abstract
condition, t(48) = 2.07, p = .044, d = 0.59, 95%
CI [1.69, 4.53]. Likewise, participants in the
concrete condition reported significantly lower
IES-R scores than those in the abstract condition
at 1-week follow-up, t(48) = 2.78, p = .009, d =
0.78, 95% CI [1.69, 10.95].
We conducted bivariate correlational analyses to
assess whether number of intrusions or IES-R scores
were related to change in affect over the training
session. These showed that there was no significant
relationship between change in affect from pre- to
posttraining and number of intrusive memories,
r = − .20, p = .229, or between affect change and
IES-R score, r = − .27, p = .095.
effect of processing mode training
on emotional reactivity
Figure 4 shows change scores in distress and horror
ratings from pre- to posttraining by condition. To
investigate the effect of training on emotional
reactivity to the posttraining test film, we conducted
a 2 (Condition) × 2 (Time) multivariate analysis
of variance (MANOVA) on distress and horror
ratings. Results indicated a significant multivariate
Condition × Time interaction, F(1, 47) = 3.50, p =
.038, ηp
2 = .13, which allowed us to interpret the
univariate ANOVAs. Univariate ANOVAs revealed
a significant Condition × Time interaction for
distress ratings, F = (1, 48) = 5.95, p = .018, ηp
2 =
.11, and horror ratings, F = (1, 48) = 5.03, p = .030,
ηp
2 = .10. This suggests that concrete training led to
less emotional reactivity to the posttraining test film
relative to abstract training. Paired samples t tests
comparing pre- and posttraining distress scores
showed a significant increase in subjective distress
ratings from pre- to posttraining test films in the
abstract condition, t(25) = −5.51, p b .001, d =
0.68, 95% CI [−21.93, −10.00], but no significant
increase in the concrete condition t(23) = 0.00, p =
1.000, d = 0.00, 95%CI [−12.51, 12.51]. Similarly,
for horror ratings, a significant increase was found in
the abstract condition, t(25) = −2.87, p = .008, d =
0.44, 95% CI [−19.50, −3.20], compared with no
significant increase in the concrete condition, t(23) =
0.65, p = .520, d = −0.12, 95% CI [−7.67, 14.76].
These findings suggest that abstract training led to
both increased distress and horror reactions to the
FIGURE 2 Mean change in ratings of affect (with standard errors) from pre- to
posttraining by condition.
411proce s s ing mode and intrus i ve memor i e sposttraining test film, whereas concrete training did
not.
There was a significant correlation between
change in affect and change in distress ratings,FIGURE 3 Mean number of intrusive memori
by condition.r = − .32, p = .047, with decreased affect from
pre-to posttraining being associated with increased
distress ratings. Since participants in the abstract
condition showed a greater decrease in affect fromes and IES-R scores (with standard errors)
FIGURES 4 Mean change in distress and horror ratings of test films
(with standard errors) by condition.
412 white & wildpre- to posttraining than those in the concrete
condition, we conducted a mixed model analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) to investigate whether
increases in distress in the abstract condition
could be attributed to decreases in affect rather
than to mode of processing. However, when change
in affect from pre- to posttraining was included as a
covariate, the effect of condition on changes in
distress ratings remained, F(1, 36) = 6.80, p =
.013, ηp
2 = .16, indicating a significant increase in
distress ratings in the abstract but not the concrete
condition (abstract: t[25] = −5.51, p b .001, d =
0.68, 95% CI [−21.93, −10.00], concrete: t[23] =
0.00, p = 1.000, d = 0.00, 95% CI [−12.51,
12.51]). There was no significant correlation
between change in affect and change in horror
ratings, r = − .21, p = .191.
relationship between predictor
variables and intrusive memories
We conducted correlational analyses to explore
relationships between predictor variables (trait
rumination and dissociation, proneness to intrusive
memories, and sleep difficulties) and primary
outcome measures (number of intrusions and
IES-R scores). None of these were significant
apart from proneness to intrusive memories,
which was significantly associated with the devel-
opment of intrusive memories following the films.
Since greater proneness to intrusive memories
following negative events in everyday life was
associated with a higher number of reported
intrusions of the films, r = .32, p = .025, we
conducted a univariate ANCOVA to investigate
the effect of condition on intrusive memories while
controlling for participants’ proneness to intrusive
memories. There was a significant effect of condi-
tion on intrusions after controlling for the effect of
proneness to intrusive memories, F(1, 47) = 4.40,p = .041, ηp
2 = .09, with fewer intrusive memories
reported in the concrete compared with the abstract
condition, t(48) = 2.07, p = .044, d = 0.59, 95%CI
[1.69, 4.53].
Discussion
This study investigated the effect of adopting an
abstract or concrete mode of processing during
exposure to analogue trauma and the subsequent
development of intrusive memories. As predicted,
individuals who were trained to adopt concrete
information processing while watching the trau-
matic films reported fewer intrusive memories and
lower PTSD symptom severity scores during the
following week compared with individuals who
were trained to adopt abstract information pro-
cessing. Concrete information processing also led to
less emotional reactivity (measured as distress and
horror) to a posttraining film relative to abstract
processing. Our results are consistent with the
broader literature showing that processing mode
influences responses to negative events (Watkins,
2008), and correlational research linking a rumi-
native, abstract style of processing after trauma
to PTSD symptoms (e.g., El-Leithy et al., 2006;
Michael et al., 2007). However, this appears to be
the first study to show that processing mode (i.e.,
abstract vs. concrete) may be causally involved in
the development of experiences such as intrusive
memories, a hallmark feature of PTSD, and that
undergoing training in concrete processing could
protect against the development of intrusions.
Furthermore, it supports models highlighting peri-
traumatic cognitive processing as a key factor
influencing distress and the development of intru-
sive memories (e.g., Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers &
Clark, 2000). Since the current study focused on
analogue trauma in a healthy, nontraumatized
population, future research could investigate
413proce s s ing mode and intrus i ve memor i e swhether the current findings extend to real-life
traumatic events and the subsequent development
of PTSD symptoms.
There are different possible mechanisms by
which concrete processing may be more adaptive
than abstract processing. First, in line with existing
cognitive models (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000),
concrete processing may lead to a more organized
memory and more adaptive appraisals of the event.
Halligan, Michael, Clark, and Ehlers (2003) found
that memory disorganization and negative ap-
praisals of a traumatic event predicted PTSD
symptoms in assault survivors. By focusing atten-
tion on contextual details and the overall sequence
of events, concrete processing may promote the
formation of a coherent narrative, whereas abstract
processing may disrupt this process. In addition,
concrete processing may generate situation-specific
appraisals whereas abstract processingmay promote
unhelpful, overgeneralized appraisals (Watkins,
2008). Future research could measure the coherence
or accuracy of memories of the trauma films as well
as assessing what kinds of appraisals participants
formed of the analogue trauma. Second, in line with
hypotheses about the beneficial effect of concrete
relative to abstract processing more generally, a
concrete style of thinking may facilitate emotional
processing of distressing events (e.g., Stöber, 1998;
Teasdale & Barnard, 1993), potentially preventing
the development of anxious appraisals (e.g., Behar
et al., 2012).
Since the abstract condition included instructions
for participants to think about “Why these sorts of
things happen,” “What it means about the world,”
and “What if this was to happen to you or someone
in your family?” one rival hypothesis to explain the
current findings is that abstract training discour-
aged participants from processing the films in a
self-referent way. Self-referent processing refers to
organizing information in relation to the self: in
relation to one’s present experience as well as to
past experiences and future goals (Farb et al.,
2007). Self-referent processing thus involves pro-
cessing what is happening in the context of oneself
and distinguishing one’s own experiences from
what is being witnessed. Lack of self-referent
processing has been associated with the develop-
ment of PTSD symptoms, such as intrusive mem-
ories, in clinical and nonclinical samples (Evans,
Ehlers, Mezey, & Clark, 2007; Laposa & Rector,
2012), presumably because when individuals fail to
engage in self-referent processing, they are less
likely to notice how the experiences they are
witnessing are different from their own experiences.
Future studies could include a measure of self-
referent processing (e.g., Ehlers, 2002).Proneness to intrusive memories of stressful or
unpleasant events in everyday life was associated
with greater intrusions of the trauma films, which is
consistent with Davies and Clark (1998), who found
that self-reported tendency to experience intrusive
memories predicted intrusive memories of a trau-
matic film clip. It is unclear why some individuals
would have a greater tendency to experience
intrusive memories, although this may relate to
individual differences in ways of processing negative
events (e.g., adopting an abstract-ruminative style) or
strategies used to regulate emotions in response to
them. Future research could further investigate
processing styles or emotion regulation strategies
that may be linked to intrusive memories after
negative events in everyday life. However, even
after controlling for proneness to intrusivememories,
a significant effect of condition remained, suggesting
that even if one were vulnerable to experiencing
intrusions, the likelihood of developing intrusive
memories after analogue trauma could be reduced
through training in concrete processing.
There are limitations that should be considered
when drawing conclusions from this study. First,
our study adopted an analogue design with a
nonclinical sample, therefore we are unable to say
whether these findings would generalize to real-life
traumatic events. Second, since we did not include a
no-training control condition, it is difficult to
determine whether concrete training is superior to
no training at all. However, because our hypotheses
related to the effects of concrete compared with
abstract training, our design fit the hypotheses to be
tested and is consistent with the design of other
studies seeking to compare abstract versus concrete
information processing (e.g., Watkins, 2004;
Watkins et al., 2008). Future research could include
a no-training control condition to ascertain wheth-
er the effects of concrete processing are indeed
superior to no training at all, as well as to abstract
processing.
In conclusion, this study provides the first empir-
ical indication that relative to processing analogue
traumatic stimuli in abstract ways, processing them
in concrete ways leads to fewer intrusive memories
over the following week and lower emotional
reactivity to a subsequent analogue trauma. Our
study also indicates that individuals who self-
reported proneness to intrusive memories in every-
day life were more likely to develop intrusive
memories in response to analogue trauma and that
concrete processing may reduce vulnerability to
developing intrusions in these individuals. These
findings improve our understanding of the role of
peritraumatic processing in the development of
intrusive memories and PTSD symptoms. It would
414 white & wildbe important to assess the generalizability of the
current findings to at-risk occupational groups who
are regularly exposed to trauma, such as emergency
service personnel and journalists in conflict zones,
since this could inform the development of interven-
tions aimed at protecting against intrusive memories
and PTSD in such populations.
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